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Summary findings
Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing military  adverse impact on capital formation  and resource
spending may improve a country's  economic growth, but  allocation.
empirical studies have produced  ambiguous results on  Model simulation results suggest a substantial long-
this point.  term peace dividend - in the form of higher capacity
Extending a standard growth  model, Knight, Loayza,  output per capita - that may result from (1) markedly
and Villanueva exploit both cross-section and time-series  lower military spending in most regions in the late 1980s
dimensions of available data to get consistent estimates  and (2) future cuts in military spending if global peace is
of the growth-retarding effects of military spending.  secured.
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ReferencesII.  Introduction
It is a widely held view that political tensions and associated high
levels of military spending are likely to detract from a country's long-run
economic growth performance.  In an insecure region, so the argument goes,
each country must devote a disproportionate share of its endowment of scarce
economic resources to "unproductive"  military spending.  In the absence of
international cooperation to reduce political tensions, military spending
may be pushed higher and higher throughout a region as each country tries to
outspend its neighbors to ensure its own security, raising regional military
expenditure levels and yielding no increase--or even a decrease--in the
security of all.  While political tensions themselves can weaken various
aspects of economic performance, there are two direct and interrelated
avenues by which higher military spending may adversely affect long-run
output growth.  First, increases in military spending may reduce the total
stock of resources that is available for alternative domestic uses such as
investment in productive capital, education, and market-oriented
technological innovation.  Second,  high spending on the military may
aggravate distortions that reduce the efficiency of resource allocation,
thereby lowering total factor  productivity.
If these effects turn out to be empirically significant, then a
converse proposition is also likely to be valid:  the sustained military
spending cuts that would become feasible as a result of improved
international security should yield a "Peace  Dividend" in the form of higher
long-run levels of capacity output.  It would then follow that forms of-2-
international  cooperation  that  succeeded  in  reducing  tensions,  and thus in
lowering  military  spending,  would  be to the  long-run  economic  benefit  of
all.  Interest  in the  potential  size  of this  Peace  Dividend  has risen
considerably  in recent  years  with the  improvements  in international  security
that  have  become  evident  for  both industrial  and developing  countries  with
the  end  of the  Cold  War  and  with the  more  recent  initiatives  aimed  at
achieving  a comprehensive  peace  in the  Middle  East.
The  view that  low  levels  of  military  spending  are  associated  with
strong  growth  performance,  and  vice  versa,  is  usually  argued  by recourse  to
casual  empiricism. For  example,  the  post-World  War II experiences  of the
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Japan  appear  to lend  support  to the  notion
that  there  are substantial  economic  benefits  from  sustaining  low  levels  of
military  spending  over  long  periods  of time. The strict  post-war  limits  on
military  expenditures  that  were imposed  on these  countries--combined  with
the  Allies'  effective  guarantee  of their  security--were  factors  that  allowed
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Japan  to  devote  relatively  large
fractions  of their  total  factor  endowments  to  productive  capital  formation,
thereby  contributing  to their  impressive  economic  growth  performance  during
the  succeeding  five  decades. Such  general  but striking  observations  have
left  most economists  with  a strong  presumption  that,  on average,  a country
that  has a relatively  low  ratio  of  military  expenditure  to  GDP is likely  to
display  relatively  strong  long-run  growth  performance.
Yet  not all  military  spending  is  unambiguously  counterproductive,  or
even  unproductive,  in an  economic  sense. It is  often  argued,  for  example,
that  expenditure  on  military  training  in  developing  countries  may contribute-3-
to improving the educational level and discipline of the labor force and may
act as a stabilizing influence in the society.  Likewise, it has been argued
(see, for example, Thompson (1974)) that military expenditure can be
economically productive to the extent that it enhances the state of national
security and improves the enforcement of property rights, thereby
encouraging private investment and growth.  Capital expenditure on the
military can also have productive uses: many developing countries still
benefit from extensive transport networks that were originally constructed
for military purposes.  These counter-examples suggest that the question of
whether, and to what extent, military spending is economically unproductive
cannot be resolved by recourse to anecdotal evidence and historical
generalizations, but instead requires rigorous theoretical and empirical
analysis.
The analysis must also be able to confront formidable estimation
problems:  even if cuts in military spending do improve growth performance
substantially, these effects are likely to appear with a long lag.  Thus in
empirical studies the beneficial effects from large military spending cuts
may be hard to disentangle in the estimation work from other factors that
influence economic growth.  Given these considerations, it is not surprising
that the existing empirical literature yields ambiguous results, not only on
the magnitude of the impact of military expenditure on long-term economic
growth, but even on  whether the effect is positive or negative.  Neverthe-
less, if national governments are to be convinced that it is to their
economic advantage to stockpile fewer guns in order to make room for more
investment in productive capital, they need to be presented with robust-4-
quantified estimates of the costs that military spending imposes on the
economic welfare of their citizens and to have convincing evidence of the
improvements in living standards that can result over the long run from
military spending cuts.
Such a quantification is attempted in this paper.  We address several
questions.  Is there a Peace Dividend from military spending cuts? If so,
how large might it eventually be?  More specifically, how much is productive
investment likely to increase in response to military spending cuts, and how
strongly will the associated improvements in the efficiency of resource
allocation increase long-run capacity output, relative to the level it would
have attained if the fraction of GNP absorbed by military spending had
remained unchanged?  Our paper extends a standard neoclassical growth model
to take account of important linkages between military spending, productive
investment, and the long-run growth of per capita capacity output.  It
implements an econometric technique for obtaining empirical estimates of the
model from a panel of time-series and cross-section data for a large sample
of developed and developing countries.
We then use the estimated model in simulation experiments designed to
gauge the size of the Peace Dividend--that is, the impact of cuts in
military spending on economic growth performance--in a number of major
geographic regions of the world.  To summarize, our estimation and
simulation analyses suggest that these Peace Dividend effects would take
some time to emerge, but would eventually be large, especially for countries
in regions--such as Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East--where
levels of military spending have traditionally been high.-5-
The next sections are organized as follows.  Section II summarizes
trends in military expenditures since the early 1970s and reviews the
empirical literature on the relationship between military spending and
economic growth.  Section III outlines our extension of a standard
neoclassical growth model and the estimation technique used.  Section IV
first presents standard cross-section estimates of the effect of military
spending on investment and economic growth and then contrasts them with the
results of our panel-data estimation.  Section V describes two simulation
experiments that help to indicate the rough order of magnitude of the
longer-run Peace Dividend from military spending cuts.  We first simulate
the long-run effects that will eventually become visible as a result of the
developments in military spending that have already taken place in various
geographic regions during the latter half of the decade of the 1980s.  We
then simulate the potential effects of further declines in military spending
that might be expected to occur in the future in various regions if a
lasting global peace could be secured.  Section VI concludes.
II.  Data and EmRirical Research on Military SRending
Throughout this paper we define the military  spending  ratio,  m, as the
ratio of total military spending to GDP; the data used here are those
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute-6-
(SIPRI).  ]/ We define  the "Peace  Dividend"  narrowly  as the  percentage
difference  between  the  level  of real  capacity  output  per  capita  that  would
result  from  a given  sustained  reduction  in  the  military  spending  ratio,  and
the  baseline  path of capacity  output  that  would  have  prevailed  in  the
absence  of such  a reduction.
1.  Trends  in  military  spending.  1972-1990
The descriptive  literature  on trends  in  military  expenditures  (see
Hewitt  (1993)  and the  primary  data  sources  cited  there)  indicates  the  large
extent  to which  the  world's  productive  resources  have  been devoted  to the
military  throughout  the  period  since  the  Second  World  War.  1/  Hewitt's
data show  important  differences  in  military  spending  across  country
groupings  as  well as over  time. On average  during  the  period  1972-90,  for
example,  over 5  percent  of  world  resources  as  measured  by the  combined  GDP
of the  124  countries  considered  by Hewitt,  were  devoted  to  military
spending. Table  1 summarizes  the  main  patterns  of military  expenditure  for
industrial  countries  and  for  developing  countries  in  various  geographic
regions. The entries  in  this  table  are  weighted  averages  of  national
military  spending  ratios,  where  the  weights  are  each  country's  share  of the
regional  total  GDP  level  measured  in U.S.  dollars  using  official  exchange
rates.
1/  Appendix  IA provides  definitions  and  sources  for  all  data  used in this
study. A detailed  discussion  and  analysis  of the  SIPRI  data  on  military
spending,  as  well as that  provided  by other  sources,  is  given  in  Hewitt
(1992,  1993). Based  on  his  detailed  analysis,  Hewitt  concludes  that  SIPRI
data are  to  be preferred  to  other  sources  for  empirical  work  of the  sort  we
undertake  here.
.2 Our  paper  makes  use of the  data  on military  expenditures  presented  in
Hewitt  (1992,  1993),  which  are  based  mainly  on statistics  published  by
SIPRI. Hewitt's  data  cover  124  industrial  and  developing  countries.-7-
Table 1.  Ratios of Military Spending  to GDP for Various
Country  Groups and Time Periods 1/
Period  Weiehted  Averages. in Percent  2/
Full Period  Period I  Period II
(1972-90)  (1972-85)  (1986-90)
Full Sample  5.10  5.19  4.84
Industrial Countries  3.90  3.97  3.70
Developing  Countries  5.20  5.54  4.26
Regional  Groupings:
Asia  5.70  6.35  3.88
Eastern  Europe  12.40  11.75  14.22
Middle  East  10.00  10.36  9.06
North Africa  7.20  8.12  4.60
Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.20  3.12  3.42
Western  Hemisphere  2.10  2.16  1.94
Source: Hewitt (1992).
I/  See Appendix  IB for lists of countries  included  in each grouping  for Hewitt's sample.
Z/ The weights are each country's share in the group GDP measured  in U.S. dollars using
official  exchange  rates.
Table  1  presents  these  averages  for  nine  country  groupings:  the  full
sample  of 124  countries;  a group  of 22 industrial  countries;  and 102
developing  countries  subdivided  into  six  regional  groups--Asia,  Eastern
Europe,  Middle  East,  North  Africa,  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Western
Hemisphere. This table  also  regroups  these  regional  data into  two  time-8-
periods. Period  I extends  over 1972-85;  it  covers  roughly  the  years  when
the  Cold  War  was still  at its  height  and  when initiatives  toward  improved
security  in the  Middle  East  had  not  yet  borne  fruit. Period  II covers  1986-
90,  which  can  be characterized  as a period  of diminishing  tensions
associated  with the  gradual  end  of the  Cold  War and  somewhat  improved
security  conditions  in  Asia,  the  Middle  East,  and  North  Africa.
The  data  in  Table  1  yield  several  broad  observations. First,  in  both
periods  military  spending  ratios  varied  widely  between  the industrial  and
developing  country  groups,  and  among  developing  countries  in different
geographic  regions. For  example,  among  the  developing  country  groups  during
Period  I  military  spending  ratios  ranged  from  a  high of over  11 percent  of
GDP for  countries  in Eastern  Europe  to only  just over 2  percent  for  the
Western  Hemisphere. These  differences  correspond  broadly  to  what one  would
expect  given  the  different  levels  of security  across  regions. For  example,
in  both  periods  countries  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  had the
highest  military  spending  ratios,  reflecting  the  failure  to achieve
comprehensive  improvements  in security  in those  regions. Next in  ranking
were  Asia  and  North  Africa,  followed  by sub-Saharan  Africa.  Finally,  the
very low  ratio  for  Western  Hemisphere  developing  countries  in  both  periods
reflects  the  low incidence  of  major  armed  conflicts  in this  region.
A second  striking  feature  of the  data is that  world military  spending
has been  declining  in recent  years. When  Hewitt  compares  the ratios  for  the
mid-1980s  with those  for  1990,  he finds  that  total  military  expenditures  of
all  countries  in  his sample  fell  sharply,  from  5.6  percent  of combined  GDP-9-
in 1985  to 4.3  percent  five  years  later. This feature  is the  most striking
in  North  Africa  and  Asia.  For  the  group  of Middle  East  countries,
where  military  spending  initially  absorbed  over 10  percent  of GDP, the
weighted  average  ratio  also fell  markedly  in the  latter  half of the  1980s.
The  industrial  countries  had a  modest  decline  in  military  spending  during
the  late  1980s  associated  with the  end  of the  Cold  War.  Developing
countries  in the  Western  Hemisphere  region,  which  already  had  very low
levels  relative  to  other  developing  regions,  experienced  only  very small
further  reductions.  An unfortunate  contrast  with these  trends  was evident
in Eastern  Europe  and  sub-Saharan  Africa,  where  ongoing  internal  and
regional  tensions  caused  weighted  average  military  spending  ratios  to  rise
by 2.5  and  0.3  percentage  points,  respectively,  in 1986-90.  1/
2.  The  relationshiR  between  military  spending  and  growth
The relationship  between  military  and  spending  output  growth  is
complicated  by the  fact  that  it  has  both short-run  and long-run  components,
which  may act  in opposite  directions. In the  short  run,  as with increases
in  other  types  of government  expenditure,  a rise  in military  spending  on
final  goods  and  services  may increase  aggregate  domestic  demand,  thereby
exerting  a short-run  stimulative  Keynesian  impact  on the  growth  rate  by
1/  Despite  the  adverse  trends  in these  two  regions,  it is noteworthy  that
the  weighted  average  military  spending  ratio  for  the  whole  group  of
developing  countries  fell  by considerably  more than  it did  in the  industrial
countries. Whereas  the  weighted  average  ratio  of developing  countries  had
been  nearly  1.6  percentage  points  higher  than  that  of the  industrial
countries  in  Period  I, in  Period  II it  fell to a level  only  0.6  percentage
points  higher.- 10  -
inducing  a rise in capacity  utilization--that  is,  it  raises  the  growth  of
current output  relative  to  that of capacity output. 1/
However,  these  short-run  stimulative  effects  do not  necessarily  lead  to
higher  levels  of capital  formation  and  capacity  output. Indeed,  over  the
longer  term increases  in  military  spending  are  likely  to exert  a  negative
effect  on capacity  output.
There  are  two channels  by which  a sustained  increase  in  military
expenditure  might  be expected  to  depress  a country's  secular  growth
performance. The first  channel  results  from the  likelihood  that,  other
things  equal,  a rise  in military  spending  exerts  a  negative  impact  on the
rate  of investment  in (public  and  private)  productive  fixed  capital. This
occurs  because  of well-known  crowding-out  effects: an increase  in military
spending  must  be financed  either  by raising  current  taxes  or by  borrowing
(future  taxes). In  either  case,  it  will lower  the  expected  after-tax  return
on productive  fixed  capital,  while  simultaneously  reducing  the  flow  of
(domestic  plus  foreign)  savings  that is  available  to  finance  productive
fixed  capital  formation  in the  domestic  economy. This  channel  is likely  to
be particularly  important  in the  case  of net-debtor  developing  countries.
Since  such  countries  are  faced  with external  financing  constraints,  a rise
1/  Hewitt  (1992)  hypothesizes  that  military  expenditures  can  have  a  net
posi,tive  or negative  impact  on economic  growth  depending  on the  alternative
use  of the  funds. He argues  that  specific  military  expenditures  on general-
use  public  infrastructure  and  promotion  of research,  as well as
demobilization  of trained  personnel  contribute  to economic  growth;  however,
military  spending  is  an inefficient  means  to enhance  growth  compared  to
private  investment  expenditure  or government  expenditure  on social
infrastructure  and  education. In the  context  of developing  countries,
Hewitt  contends  that  the  justification  for  military  expenditures  must  be
from  national  security  grounds,  since  the  economic  benefits  are  limited.- II  -
in  military  spending--to  the  extent  that  it is  not  associated  with larger
net capital  inflows  to finance  a higher  external  current  account  deficit--
can  be expected  to crowd  out  capital  investment  and/or  private
consumption.  1/
A second  channel  by  which  military  expenditures  may  affect  the  growth
path of capacity  output  is  through  their  direct  impact  on the  efficiency  of
resource  allocation. Since  military  spending  is  not  governed  by market
processes,  it tends  to create  distortions  in relative  prices  that  result  in
a dead-weight  loss to total  productive  capacity. In  addition,  it  may exert
negative  externalities  on capacity  output. There  are  several  ways in  which
these  inefficiencies  directly  affect  the  growth  rate.  First,  a higher  dead-
weight  loss to domestic  production  results  from  either  an increase  in
contemporaneous  taxes  or  heavier  borrowing  to finance  higher  military
spending;  borrowing  from  the  banking  system  often  leads  to  higher  inflation,
which  distorts  resource  allocation.  2!  Second,  research  and  development
activities  may concentrate  on military  progress  at the  expense  of techno-
logical  advances  in  economically-productive  areas. Third,  policies
implemented  to support  a military  program  are  often  detrimental  to efficient
resource  allocation  and  market  growth: examples  are  trade  restrictions,
nationalization  of  military  equipment  producers,  military  procurement
1/  Hewitt  (1992)  notes  that  higher  military  expenditures  may  be,financed
through  higher  external  borrowing,  lower  private  consumption,  lower  private
investment,  and lower  expenditures  on other  government  programs,  including
productive  ones such  as education  and  health  services,  public  infra-
structure,  and the  police  and  judicial  systems. In  general,  the likely
consequences  would  be lower  current  consumption  and  investment  levels  and
lower  future  growth,  the  exact  mix  being  dependent  on the  particular
financing  channel.
2/  See  Tommasi (1995)  and  de  Gregorio  (1991).- 12 -
preferences  for  certain  firms  and  industries,  and  compulsory  military
service. Finally,  rent-seeking  activities  grow  around  the  military  because
of its  non-competitive  allocation  of resources. In this  way, over  and  above
their  depressing  effect  on the  level  of investment,  military  expenditures
may exert  a direct  adverse  impact  on the  economy's  productive  efficiency.
These  considerations  suggest  that  the  net  effect  of a rise in  military
expenditure  on a country's  growth  rate  and  its  steady  state  level  of
capacity  output  is likely  to  be negative. Therefore,  one  would  expect  to
find  evidence  of this  negative  impact  in longer-run  economic  data  both
across  countries  and over  time. However,  it is  obviously  difficult  to
disentangle  empirically  the  potential  positive  short-run  effect  of the
demand  stimulus  associated  with  an increase  in  military  spending  from  the
depressing  effect  of  high  military  spending  on the  longer-run  growth  path  of
capacity  output,  particularly  if the  estimation  work fails  to exploit  both
the  time-series  and  cross-section  dimensions  of the  data.  The  striking
ambiguity  of past econometric  results  in  the  face  of strong  anecdotal
evidence  on the  long-run  economic  benefits  of lowering  military  expenditure
suggests  that  weaknesses  in the  econometric  techniques  used to test  these
hypotheses  may  be a problem.
Thus it is  not surprising  that  a number  of past  attempts  to  subject  the
relation  between  military  spending  and  growth  relationship  to  empirical
testing--Benoit  (1973,  1978)  and  Frederiksen  and  Looney  (1982)--seem  to  have
uncovered  empirical  support  for  the  thesis  that  military  expenditures  were
not detrimental  to growth. Benoit  (1978),  using  data  for  44 developing
countries  over 1950-65,  finds  a  positive  association  between  military- 13  -
spending and growth of civilian per capita output.  In contrast, Rothschild
(1977) on the basis of rank correlations on growth, exports, and military
spending for 14 OECD countries during 1956-69, concludes that higher
military spending is associated  with lower exports and lower economic
growth.  Deger and Smith (1983)  find that the direct impact of military
expenditures on growth is positive, while the effect on savings is negative;
in their view the net impact  of military expenditures on growth is negative
because the negative indirect effect on savings outweighs the positive
direct impact.  Biswas and Ram (1986)  conclude that military expenditures
neither help nor hinder economic growth.  Aschauer (1989) finds that
government expenditure on infrastructure in the  United States has a positive
effect on growth, while military capital expenditures have virtually no
impact.  Using data for 71 countries over the period 1969-89, Landau (1993)
concludes that military expenditure is not associated with lower rates of
economic growth, capital formation, or government social and infrastructure
spending.  Some other studies have obtained a negative, but weak empirical
relationship between military spending and economic growth. 1/  In the
next section we specify a model and suggest a technique of estimation that
are both intended to address the limitations of past empirical research on
this relationship.
1/  See Chan (1985) for a selected bibliography.- 14 -
III.  Model and Empirical Methodology
We now extend the standard neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956)
and Swan (1956) to incorporate the linkages between military spending,
productive investment, and the growth of capacity output.  We do this by
expanding the empirical analysis of this model that we undertook in Knight,
Loayza, and Villanueva (1993) to incorporate the possible effects of
military spending on the growth path of per capita capacity output.  First,
we expand the basic neoclassical growth equation:  in addition to the
investment ratio and other factors considered in our earlier paper, it now
includes the military spending ratio as a determinant of capacity output.
Second, we specify an explicit investment function in which the ratio of
investment to GDP is determined by several standard factors, and also by the
fraction of GDP that is devoted to military spending.
Our equation for the rate of economic growth is based on the Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992)  version of the Solow-Swan model.  It is derived by
linearizing the transition path of output per capita around its steady-state
level. j/  The resulting equation specifies output growth as a function of
initial output and variables that condition for the economy's steady state.
The conditioning variables that we include are the ratio of investment to
GDP; the rate of population growth; a proxy for the degree of openness of
the economy to international trade (i.e., an index of the degree of
restrictiveness of its system of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
I/  For details of this derivation, see Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva
(1993).  The growth effects that we discuss in this paper apply to the
transition to the steady state.- 15  -
international trade); the Barro-Lee (1993) proxy for the incidence of
wars; 1/  the ratio of military spending to GDP; and a dummy variable that
catches any otherwise unspecified country-specific effects.  In accordance
with the Solow-Swan model we assume that the conditioning variables are
exogenous with respect to output growth;  in particular, the ratio of
military expenditures to GDP is assumed to be unaffected by the rate of
output growth. 2/
Equation  (1) specifies  the per  capita  output  growth  rate,  Zi,t-Zi,t1j,
where z represents the natural logarithm of output per capita:
Zi,t-Zi,tt-l =  Onln(ni,t+g+6)  +Okln(ski,t)  +Orln(m,  t)  +Ohln(shi)  +Ofln(fi)
+Owln(wi)  +-yzi,  t-1  +(t+l  i+  i,  t  (1)
where ln indicates a natural logarithm; the indices i and t represent the
country and time period, respectively; n is the average population growth
rate; g is the technological growth rate, 6  is the rate of depreciation of
1/  The Barro-Lee proxy variable for the incidence of wars is defined for
each country as the number of war-years as a fraction of total years in the
period 1960-85.  See Barro and Lee (1993).
2/  There are three differences  between the growth equation specified in
this paper and the one used in our 1993 paper.  First, in this paper we do
not include the ratio of government fixed investment to GDP as an
explanatory variable, since  we found it to be statistically insignificant in
our previous study.  Second, and more important, we now include as a
regressor the ratio of military expenditures to GDP.  Finally, to isolate
the effect of military expenditures on the allocation of productive
resources, we control for the incidence of wars on economic growth by
including the above-mentioned Barro-Lee proxy.- 16 -
the stock of physical capital, and g+6 is assumed to be equal to 0.05 1/;
sk is the ratio of physical capital investment to GDP; m is the ratio of
military expenditures to GDP; sh is a proxy for the ratio of human capital
investment to GDP; f is a proxy for the degree of restrictiveness of the
economy's international trade system; w is the proxy for the incidence of
wars; (t represents time-specific factors; pi represents country-specific
factors; and E  is a white-noise error term.
In order to allow for the indirect effect of military spending on
growth via its impact on productive investment, we extend the model of our
earlier paper to include a second equation which specifies the ratio of
investment in fixed capital as a function of the rate of investment in  human
capital, sh;  the restrictiveness of the trade system, f; the incidence of
wars proxy, w; and the military spending ratio, m.  The investment equation
is:
l(  ski,  t)  =  77n  ln(ni,t  +g  +6  )  +77mln(mi,  t)  +77h  ln(shi)  +r7f  ln(f  i)  +i7wln(wi)
+ Hi +  £i,t  (2)
As already noted, we use Hewitt's annual data on the ratios of military
expenditure for all the countries in our sample.  However, owing to
limitations on the availability of data for some countries on the other
1/  The assumption that g+6=0.05 follows Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
We found that although changes in this number affect the estimated en,  they
do not significantly affect the other estimated coefficients.- 17 -
variables that enter into equations (1) and (2),  our estimation sample is a
subset of the countries covered by Hewitt. .1/
It covers 79 countries; the period is 1971-1985.  The countries and
regions included, together with the simple and weighted means and standard
deviations for their ratios of military spending to GDP over 1971-85 and
1986-90, are presented  in Table 2.  A close comparison of the weighted
averages for each of the country groups in our sample with those for the
full group of 124 countries discussed by Hewitt shows that, for the regions
we include, our sample has characteristics that are quite similar to those
highlighted in the Hewitt sample.  In particular, the  magnitudes of the
declines in the weighted average military spending ratios in each region are
quite similar in the two samples. Z/  These broad similarities  between the
sample we use for estimation and Hewitt's data give us a degree of
confidence that although our estimating sample has a less comprehensive
country coverage it nevertheless retains broadly similar characteristics.
1/  The countries excluded from our sample are those in Eastern Europe
(including the countries of the former Soviet Union and the former
Democratic Republic of Germany), and countries for  which complete data were
not available for other variables in the model.  The latter include several
developing countries in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Western Hemisphere.
Consistent with other empirical studies of long-term economic growth, we
also exclude from the estimation sample a few countries--mostly in the
Middle East and North Africa--whose main source of GDP comes from the
extraction of petroleum reserves.  The list of countries and data sources
for the variables used to estimate our model are presented in Appendix IA
and B.
2/  The exception is sub-Saharan Africa, where the country coverage of our
sample is much less comprehensive than Hewitt's owing to the unavailability
of data on the other variables in equations (1) and (2).  As a result of
these differences in coverage, our data show a small decline in military
spending ratios in these countries, while Hewitt's more comprehensive data
show a small rise.- 18  -
Table 2. 79-Country  Sample: Ratios  of Military Spending  to GDP for Various  Country  Groups  and Time Periods  1/
Period  averages,  in percent  Comparison  of changes  (Period  11  minus  Period  I)
Full Period  Period  I  Period  11  Our 79-Country  Hewitt's  Sample
(1972-90)  (1972-85)  (1986-90)  Sample
Full Sample
Weighted  Average  3.80  3.89  3.59  -0.30  -0.35
Simple  Average  3.35  3.44  3.08  -0.36  ..
(Standard  deviation)  (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.21)  .
Industrial  Countes
Weighted  Avcrage  3.90  3.99  3.71  -0.28  -0.27
Simple  Average  3.01  3.07  2.85  -0.22  ...
(Standard  deviation)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.12)  ...  ..
Developing  Countries
Weighted  Average  3.10  3.14  2.80  -0.34  -1.28
Simple  Average  3.48  3.58  3.17  -0.41  ...
(Standard  deviation)  (0.26)  (0.16)  (0.24)  ...
Regional  Grouaping
Asian Developing
Weighted Average  3.90  3.94  3.75  -0.19  -2.47
Simple  Averge  3.66  3.64  3.71  0.07  ...
(Standard  deviation)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.33)  ...  ...
Middle East
Weighted  Average  6.80  6.93  6.49  -0.44  -1.30
Simple  Average  10.70  11.24  9.21  -2.03
(Standarddeviation)  (1.35)  (1.07)  (0.82)  ...  ...
North Africa
Weighted  Average  6.50  7.59  3.38  -4.21  -3.52
Simple  Average  6.06  6.72  4.19  -2.53  ...
(Standard  deviation)  (2.27)  (2.29)  (0.48)  ...
Sub-Saharan  Africa
Weighted  Average  2.70  2.83  2.52  -0.31  0.30
Simple  Average  2.70  2.75  2.58  -0.17  ...
(Standard  deviation)  (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.12)  ...
Western  Hemisphere
Weighted  Average  2.20  2.28  1.80  -0.48  -0.22
Simple Average  2.43  2.49  2.26  -0.23  ...
(Standard  deviation)  (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.25)
Source: Hewitt (1992).
I/  Sec  Appendix lB.  for lists of countries  included  in each  grouping  for both Hewitt's  and  our sample.- 19  -
Since the available data on military activity indicate that the
fraction of GDP devoted to the military varies widely both  across countries
and over time, our empirical methodology is designed to exploit these two
dimensions of the data to overcome some of the shortcomings of past
empirical work and obtain robust estimates of the effect of military
expenditures on investment and economic growth. 1/  Specifically, we
employ an econometric technique that was proposed in our earlier paper
(Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva (1993)) to deal with time-series cross-
section data.
To construct the panel data set we work with non-overlapping intervals
of five years each.  We have cross-sectional data covering output growth and
several other variables in three separate five-year time periods:  1971-75,
1976-80, and 1981-85.  Since data for all variables are available for 79
countries, this gives us a relatively large panel-data sample of 79 x 3 -
237 observations on the dependent variables in equations (1) and (2).  We
measure the growth of per capita output over a 5-year interval, rather than
a single year.  This procedure provides a simple way of averaging out short-
run cyclical variations in the rate of capacity utilization, thereby helping
to ensure that this variable approximates output growth at the average rate
of capacity utilization in each five-year time period for each country in
the sample. 2/  Similarly, the data for the investment ratio sk  are
i/  In this paper, the term investment, by itself, refers to physical
capital investment.  When we refer to human capital investment, we say so
explicitly.
.Z/  This follows the technique used by Phillips (1958) to ensure that his
estimated relation between the rate of change of nominal wages and the level
of the unemployment rate was approximately a phase line.- 20 -
averaged over the same 5-year intervals.  Thus some variables are indexed by
both time, t, and country, i; these are the variables z, h, sk,  m and sh,
for which panel data are available.  The remaining variables f and w, for
which we have only cross-sectional data, are indexed only by country.  The
observations for the level of per capita output that are used to obtain the
growth rate for each 5-year interval correspond exactly to the years 1970,
1975, 1980, and 1985.  For the rest of the panel variables--n, sh,  m--
observations correspond to the averages over the five year intervals 1971-
75, 1976-80, 1981-85.  For the cross-sectional variables--sh, f, w--observa-
tions for each country correspond to averages over tne whole 15-year period
(1971-85)  under consideration or, in a few cases, that portion of it for
which data are available.
The fact that panel data are available for most of the variables of
interest allows us to account for both time-specific and country-specific
effects.  Country-specific effects are especially important in the present
analysis.  There are a host of factors that are peculiar to each country
(e.g., government policies, resource endowments, social institutions, and
cultural traits) and these may well be correlated with the regressors
considered in the model.  Failure to account for them would lead to
inconsistent estimates of the parameters.  We control for the time-specific
effects by removing the time means from each variable.  To account for the
country-specific effects, we use the methodology proposed by Chamberlain
(1982, 1984), commonly known as the H-matrix technique.  Given that the
growth regression contains a lagged dependent variable, the fixed-effects- 21 -
"within" estimator that is commonly used to control for specific effects
would yield inconsistent estimates.
A detailed exposition on the application of the fl-matrix  technique to
growth regressions estimated using panel data is presented in our earlier
paper (Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva (1993)).  Basically, the application
has two steps.  First, we replace the country-specific factor pi t by its
linear predictor E*( it)  plus an error term in the regression equation for
each time period.  The linear predictor is a linear function of the
regressors for all time periods.  This yields a system of reduced-form
regression equations, with one equation for each time period.  Second, we
estimate the reduced-form parameters in the system and, from them, obtain
the structural parameter estimates through a minimum-distance estimation
procedure.  Chamberlain (1982) shows that this procedure results in
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates.
IV.  Estimation Results
This section presents the estimation results for our two-equation
growth model.  To illustrate the difficulties (discussed in Section II) that
may have arisen in past empirical work on the impact of military spending on
growth, we first employ a standard estimation procedure that is widely in
use in empirical research in growth economics.  Specifically, we obtain
standard "cross-section" estimates of equations (1) and (2)  using the data
on output growth for our 79-country sample averaged over the whole  period
1971-85 and average levels for each country of the values of the right-hand
variables over the same period.  This approach will show us what the- 22 -
estimated parameters of our model would look like if it was estimated
without taking full advantage of the time-series dimension of the data set.
Next, we re-estimate the model on our sample of panel data observations
using our proposed econometric approach, and compare the parameter estimates
obtained using the two alternative estimation methods.
1.  Standard cross-section estimation
Table 3 reports standard cross-section estimates of the growth equation
(equation 1).  To account for geopolitical and developmental differences
across regions we consider two regional dummy variables in our cross-country
regressions, one for Africa and the other for the developing countries in
the Western Hemisphere.  We find that only the investment ratio, the proxy
variable for international trade restrictions, and the dummy variable for
the developing countries in the Western Hemisphere enter significantly with
the expected signs.  Indeed, in line with the results of several of the
empirical studies cited in Section II above, in the cross-sectional
regression the estimated coefficient of military spending has a positive  but
statistically insignificant estimated effect on growth.  Note also that when
the military spending ratio is included in the cross-section regression for
equation 1, the coefficient estimates for the other variables change very
little.  The same results are obtained when the Barro-Lee proxy for the
incidence of wars is included.
We believe that these rather inconclusive cross-sectional results help
to illustrate why past empirical work cited in Section II has been affected
by the application of estimation procedures that do not take advantage of
all the information available in the dataset.- 23  -
Table 3.  Standard Cross-Section Regressions for the Growth Rate
No.  of Countries  79  79  79
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT
(T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)
Zt_  I  -0.0057  -0.0055  -0.0057
(-1.17)  (-1.17)  (-1. 19)
ln(n+0.05)  0.0103  0.0091  0.0088
(1.51)  (1.37)  (1.28)
ln(sk)  0.0112  0.0110  0.0107
(2.73)  (2.68)  (2.57)
ln(sh)  0.0013  0.0012  0.0012
(0.86)  (0.87)  (0.89)
n(f)  -0.0189  -0.0181  -0.0184
(-2.12)  (-2.12)  (-2.11)




constant  0.0537  0.0471  0.0489
(1.79)  (1.70)  (1.74)
AFRICA  1/  -0.0079  -0.0072  -0.0070
(-1.09)  (-2.98)  (-0.95)
WESTERN  -0.0139  -0.0128  -0.0125
HEMISPHERE  (-2.78)  (-2.48)  (-2.30)
Adjusted R2 0.244  0.241  0.231
1/  'Africa'  is defined as countries in the North  and sub-Saharan African regions.
Table 4 reports the estimation results for a standard cross-section
regression of the investment equation (equation 2).  Only the proxy for
investment in human capital and the dummy variable for Africa exert positive
and statistically significant effects on physical capital investment.  In
particular, the cross-section regressions cannot identify  a significant- 24  -
Table 4.  Standard Cross-Section Regressions  for the
Ratio of Investment to GDP
No. of Countries  79  79
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT
(T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)
ln(n + 0.05)  -0.1400  -0.1478
(-0.79)  (-0.89)
ln(sh)  0.0702  0.0664
(3.47)  (3.43)
In  -0.0895  -0.0985
(-0.36)  (-0.41)




constant  2.1726  2.1620
(4.16)  (4.31)
AFRICA 1/  -0.4054  0.3723
(-2.10)  (-1.89)
WESTERN HEMISPHERE  -0.1736  -0.1362
(-1.37)  (-1.05)
Adjusted R2 0.463  0.483
1/  "Africa" is defined as countries in the North and sub-Saharan African regions.
relationship,  whether positive or negative, running from the level of
military spending to the rate of investment in productive fixed capital.
When Barro and Lee's proxy for the incidence of wars is added to the
regression equation, the parameter estimates change only slightly; as
expected, it exerts a negative effect on investment, and the effect is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.- 25  -
2.  Panel data estimation
We now contrast these standard results with our panel data estimates of
the investment and growth equations.  Table 5 reports our panel-data
estimates of the growth equation (equation 1).  First, consider the
estimation results when military expenditure is not included in the
regression.  The lagged  value of per capita output is significant and
negatively related to the growth rate.  This is the standard result in the
empirical growth literature, known as "conditional convergence."  Our
results imply that the growth rate of population is not a significant
determinant of output growth.  This is somewhat surprising in the light of
previous studies which find a negative relationship on the basis of data
from 1960 to 1985.  Investments in physical capital and human capital both
exert a positive effect on growth, and trade restrictions have a negative
influence.
When we include the military spending ratio as an explanatory variable
in our panel data regression, we find that it has a negative and significant
effect on growth.  It implies that, in addition to crowding out physical
investment (as analyzed below and reported in Table 6), a rise in military
spending also  exerts an independent direct negative impact on economic
growth.  This is true even though we are additionally controlling for human
capital investment, population growth, and trade restrictions.  The panel
data estimation results of the growth equation that are reported in Table 5
are therefore consistent with the view that a  rise in  military spending
adversely affects the growth performance of the economy.- 26  -
Table 5.  Panel Regressions  for the Growth Rate
No. of countries  79  79  79
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT
(T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)
ZI_l  -0.0989  -0.6656  -0.0262
(-3.83)  (-2.96)  (-1.27)
ln(n+0.05)  0.00003  0.0064  -0.0004
(.003)  (0.48)  (-0.03)
ln(sk)  0.0227  0.0225  0.0165
(3.65)  (3.94)  (2.92)
ln(sh)  0.0603  0.0404  0.0158
(3.73)  (2.99)  (1.32)
In(J)  -0.0286  -0.0204  -0.0091
(-4.35)  (-3.39)  (-1.63)




Wald test for  28.19  51.61  55.59
uncorrelated effects  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
(p-value)
A further important result of our empirical work is that inclusion of
the military spending ratio reduces the absolute size of the estimated
coefficients of physical investment,  human investment, and trade
restrictions in the growth equation.  This follows from the fact that
military expenditures are generally negatively correlated with both types of
investment, and positively correlated with the intensity of trade- 27  -
Table 6.  Panel Regressions  for the Investment to GDP Ratio
No. of Countries  79  79  79
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT  COEFFICIENT
(T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)  (T-RATIO)
In(n+0.05)  0.5081  0.6506  0.6950
(3.37)  (4.65)  (4.74)
tn(sh)  0.2707  0.2511  0.2294
(2.99)  (2.99)  (2.99)
In(l)  -0.1225  -0.0947  -0.0766
(-2.03)  (-1.69)  (-1.52)




Wald test for  5.46  38.57  65.85
uncorrelated effects  (0.1410)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
(p-value)
restrictions. 1/  Given that both human capital investment and the
openness of the trade system have a significant positive impact on output
growth, their negative correlation with military expenditures indicates the
possibility of other channels through which military spending adversely
affects growth; namely, through crowding out human capital investment and
1/  As expected, the Barro-Lee proxy for the incidence of wars exerts a
direct negative and significant effect on economic growth.  The inclusion of
this variable in the panel estimates also alters the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients of the other regressors.  In fact, all such
coefficients decrease in absolute size, reflecting the fact that levels of
both physical and human capital are negatively correlated with the incidence
of military conflict, whereas the incidence of military conflict is
positively correlated with intensification of trade restrictions and thus
with increases in military expenditures.- 28 -
fostering the adoption of various types of trade restrictions. j/  Due to
the lack of panel data on the proxies for  human capital investment and trade
restrictions, we cannot run separate regressions explaining the variables sh
and f, and thus we are unable to quantify such effects.  However, as
explained below, we do estimate the effect of military spending on physical
capital investment.
Table 6 reports the panel data estimates for the investment equation.
In contrast to the standard cross-section results, in our panel regressions
of this equation all the variables now enter with the expected sign and all
but one are significant at the 5 percent level; the effect of f is
significant about the 20 percent level.  The inclusion of the proxy for the
incidence of wars does not importantly modify the parameter estimates but,
as expected, it affects investment in a negative and significant way.
Population growth and human capital investment  have positive effects on
physical capital investment, while a more restrictive trade system has a
negative impact.  Most interesting for our purposes--and consistent with our
priors--the panel data estimates reveal that a rise in the ratio of military
spending has a statistically significant negative impact on investment.
Thus our results for equation 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that a
rise in military spending does indeed lead to crowding out of investment in
productive fixed capital.
1/  The positive correlation between military spending and trade
restrictions is particularly strong in developing nations.  Given that most
of these countries import military armaments from industrial countries, they
are more exposed to balance of payments problems.  Partly for this reason,
developing countries also tend to operate more restrictive trade regimes.- 29  -
V.  The Peace Dividend:  Simulation Experiments
As mentioned in Section II, the ending of the Cold War in Europe and
the other improvements in international security that occurred in the latter
half of the 1980s were associated with significant reductions in militarv
spending in a number of major geographic regions.  In addition, the ongoing
peace process in the Middle East raises the prospect that substantial
further cuts in military spending could take place in this region in future
years.  Thus it is interesting to use our empirical estimates of the
quantitative impact of military expenditures on investment and growth
obtained in the preceding section to assess the timing and rough order of
magnitude of the Peace Dividend effects that might occur in each region.
1.  Simulated long-run effects of the changes in military spending that
took place in the late 1980s
As a first step, we run simulations to see  what our model has to say
about the likely long-run effects of the major changes in military spending
ratios that took place in a number of regions during the late 1980s.  As the
data in Table 1 above make clear, the improvements in international security
that became evident during the 1980s permitted governments in all but two- 30 -
geographic regions to achieve reductions in their military spending
ratios.  1/
While our estimation results indicate that the effects of these
changes may eventually be substantial, the estimated lags also suggest that
they will take time to appear.  The simulation experiments provide a useful
gauge of the timing and size of these effects.  We undertake these
simulations for the industrial  countries and for each of the groups of
developing countries in the six regions analyzed by Hewitt and described in
Section II:  Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.  The exogenous shock that
generates each simulation is the change in the military spending ratio that
took  place in each region during the second  half of the 1980s.
Specifically, we take the difference between Hewitt's weighted average
military spending ratio for Period I (1972-85)  and the corresponding ratio
for Period II (1986-90) for each country group in Table 1.  The levels and
the resulting changes are reprinted in the first three lines of Table 7.
1/  For example, when the average ratio of military spending to GDP for
the period 1972-85 is compared to the average for 1986-90, it is evident
that between these two subperiods military expenditure declined as a
percentage of GDP in all regions except Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan
Africa.  Although the ratio fell only modestly in the industrial countries
(from 4 percent to 3.7 percent) it declined sharply in a number of regions
of the developing world.  The largest reduction occurred in North Africa,
from 8.1 percent in 1972-85 to 4.6 percent in 1986-90; followed by Asia
(6.3 percent to 3.9 percent); the Middle East (10.4  percent to 9.1 percent);
and the Western Hemisphere (2.2  percent to 1.9 percent).  By contrast, there
was a relatively large rise  in the military spending ratio in Eastern Europe
(11.8 percent to 14.2 percent) and a modest rise (3.1  percent to
3.4 percent) in sub-Saharan Africa.- 31 -
In these simulation experiments we assume for simplicity that the
change in the average military spending ratio in each region is spread over
the whole period 1986-90, 1/ and that after reaching its new level in 1990
the military ratio remains constant thereafter.  The stylized paths of the
changes in military spending ratios that occurred in each region during the
late 1980s are illustrated by the solid lines in the top panels of Figure 1.
The numerical parameters of the model are our panel estimates from Tables 5
and  6. Z/
Table 7 and Figure 1 (solid lines) summarize the simulation results for
each of the seven regions.  Line 4 indicates the change in the investment
ratio that results from the shift in the military spending ratio in each
region.  For example, in the Asian developing and North African countries,
which had the biggest cuts in their military spending ratios over 1986-90,
the resulting increase in investment is nearly 0.7 percent of GDP; in the
Middle East investment rises by 0.25 percent of GDP; in the industrial
countries and the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere the rise is
about 0.15 percentage points.
1/  Specifically, we assume that the natural logarithm of the military
spending ratio declines linearly over this period.
2/ To implement the simulation we first substitute equation (2) into
equation (1) to obtain the reduced-form relationship between the military
spending ratio and the growth path.  From this reduced-form equation we
obtain the deviation of the simulated growth path for each region owing to
the change in the military spending ratio from the path that would have
prevailed if this exogenous change had not occurred (for a detailed
explanation see Appendix II).  Note that since ours is a long-run model the
simulations trace the dynamic effects of this change on regional levels of
capacity  output.  We are not interested in the short-run Keynesian
multiplier effects of military spending cuts, since these affect actual
output relative  to  capacity output.- 32  -
Table 7.  The Peace Dividend:  Simulated Long-Run Effects of Changes in Military Spending Ratios
in the Late 1980s on Capacity Output  I/
Country Groups
Industrial  Developing Countries
Countries  Asia  Eastem  Middle  North  Sub-Saharan  Westem
Europe  East  Africa  Africa  Hemisphere
(In percent of GDP)
I  Average Military
Spending Ratio,  3.97  6.35  11.75  10.34  8.13  3.12  2.16
1972-1985 2/
2. Average Military
Spending Ratio,  3.70  3.88  14.22  9.06  4.60  3.42  1.94
1986-1990  2/
3.  Change in Military
Spending Ratio  -0.27  -2.47  2.47  -1.28  -3.53  0.30  -0.22
(2 minus 1)
4.  Associated Change in
Ratio of Investment  0.14  0.66  -0.48  0.25  0.70  -0.11  0.15
to GDP  3/
Time
Horizon  Simulated Minus Baseline Growth Rates of Per Capita GDP
___ (Years)
(In percent per annum)
I  0.010  0.(071  -0.028  0.019  0.082  -0.013  0.015
5  0.049  0.339  -0.131  0.091  0.391  -0.063  0.073
10  0.043  0.297  -0.115  0.079  0.343  -0.055  0.064
25  0.029  0.199  -0.077  0.053  0.230  -0.037  0.043
50  0.015  0.103  -0.040  0.027  0.119  -0.019  0.022
co  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Time
Horizon  Simulated Minus Baseline Levels of Per Capita GDP
(__  Years)
(In percent of baseline GDP)
I  0.0  0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.0  0.0
5  0.1  1.0  -0.4  0.3  1.2  -0.2  0.2
10  0.4  2.6  -1.0  0.7  3.0  -0.5  0.6
25  0.9  6.2  -2.4  1.7  7.2  -1.2  1.3
50  1.4  9.8  -3.8  2.6  11.3  -1.8  2.1
___  ____  2.0  13.6  -5.3  3.6  15.7  -2.3  2.9
I/  The simulation exercise is based on the parameter estimates given in Table 5, column 4, and Table 6, column 4.  Details on
how the simulations were performed are given in Appendix 11.
2!  Derived from data in Hewitt (1992).
3/  The change in investment ratio is produced by the total change in military spending ratio with respect to the baseline military
spending ratio (average during 1972-85).- 33 -
The middle panel in Table 7 shows the difference between the simulated
growth  rates  of capacity output per capita and their baseline paths that
will eventually result from the changes in military spending levels that
actually occurred in the late 1980s.  The lower panel shows the percentage
difference in the levels  of capacity output per capita in each region
relative to their baseline paths.
In our model, a one-shot increase in the military spending ratio causes
a permanent rise in the level of GDP as a result of a transitory rise in the
growth rate:  since our first set of simulations assumes that military
spending ratios are held constant at their new levels from 1990 onward, the
growth rates of per capita output in each region gradually decelerate again
until they return to their baseline levels.  As a result, the percentage
deviation in the levels of per capita GDP  (shown in the lower bottom panel
of Table 7 and the solid lines in the lower panel of Figure 1) continue to
rise at decreasing rates until the new levels are reached in each region.
Obviously, the geographic regions that experienced the largest
reductions in military spending ratios in the late 1980s are the ones that
will eventually benefit from the largest gains in capacity output per
worker.  As indicated in the middle panel of Table 7, these past cuts are
projected to result in modest but persistent gains in annual growth rates.
For example, in the cases of Asia and North Africa, where military spending
cuts were largest, the gains in annual growth rates reach a maximum that is
about 0.3 percent per year higher than the baseline growth rate; the effects
are of course smaller for other country groups, particularly the industrial
countries and the developing countries in the Western Hemisphere.- 34 -
Owing to the dynamic properties of our estimated growth model
(relatively slow conditional convergence), these modest deviations in growth
rates persist for quite a long time, and as a result their ultimate effects
on the levels  of capacity output per worker are substantial.  For example,
our simulations indicate that in the long run the changes in military
spending ratios of the late 1980s would--if sustained--result in a gain in
the capacity level of per capita output in North Africa of nearly 16 percent
relative to the baseline level that would have prevailed in the absence of
such cuts; for Asia, output would eventually be nearly 14 percent higher;
and for the Middle East it would be 3.6 percent higher.
These results suggest that the long-run Peace Dividend from the
military spending cuts that have already taken place in several regions
during the late 1980s will eventually cumulate to large effects on the
levels of capacity output. 1/  By contrast, because of the rise in
military spending ratios that occurred in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan
Africa during the latter half of the 1980s, per capita GDP in these regions
would be lower  by some 5.3 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively, in the
long run.
1/  Even for the industrial countries and Western Hemisphere countries,
where the military spending cuts during the latter half of the 1980s were
modest (from their relatively low initial levels), per capita output levels
would eventually be 2.0 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively, above the
baseline paths.- 35 -
2.  Simulated effects of a generalized peace in all regions
Our second set of simulation experiments looks at the long-run gains in
capacity output that might result from future  large military spending cuts
that might be associated with the achievement of a generalized peace in all
geographic regions of the world.  Specifically, we pose the following
questions.  If global peace were achieved, by how much might military
spending ratios decline?  What might be the size of the stimulus to
productive investment?  How soon might the resulting Peace Dividend exert
positive effects on the growth paths of capacity output in various
geographic regions?  How large might these effects  ultimately be?  These
are, of course, highly speculative questions.  Even if there was a sustained
improvement in global security, it is not clear how large the resulting cuts
in military spending ratios would actually be, since most countries would
probably still wish to maintain at least some minimal level of military
preparedness.
We have already emphasized that--reflecting the differing levels of
political tensions and risks of military conflict in different parts of the
world--there has been a wide regional variation in ratios of military
spending to GDP throughout the period for which comparable data are
available.  In particular, as seen in Table 1, developing countries in the
Western Hemisphere have maintained the lowest average military spending
ratios of any region (around 2 percent) over a long period of time.  Since
the Western Hemisphere developing countries have avoided major armed
conflicts throughout this period, it is  plausible to assume that the average
military spending ratio already observed for this region can be taken as a- 36 -
simple approximation of the minimum level that could be attained in other
regions if a lasting world peace were achieved.
Thus our second set of simulations assumes that the military spending
ratio in each  region declines steadily over a 10-year period from its
regional average level over 1986-90 to the average level observed for the
Western Hemisphere developing countries over the same period--that is, just
under 2 percent of GDP.  We then simulate the effects of these reductions in
military spending on the growth paths of per capita capacity output for each
of the regions, and compare them to the baseline paths that would have been
traced out if military spending ratios  had remained at the average levels
observed over 1972-1985.  Thus this second set of simulations includes both
the effects of the changes in military spending that occurred in 1986-90
(relative to the average levels for 1972-85) and  the additional effects that
would eventually result from a generalized international peace.  The results
are summarized in Table 8 and Figure 1 (dotted lines).
In our model, these large further reductions in military spending
ratios would act as a strong stimulus to productive investment in all
regions.  The fourth line of Table 8 shows that the resulting increases in
investment ratios would be especially striking for Eastern Europe
(4.9 percent of GDP) and the  Middle East (3.3 percent of GDP), the regions
that--since they currently have high levels of military spending--stand to
gain the most from reducing them to the minimum level associated with a
generalized peace.
The dotted lines in the upper panels in Figure 1 show the hypothetical
downward paths of military spending for each region over the next 10 years.Figure 1. Various Country Groups: Simulated Long-run Effects of Actual Past  Changes
in Military Spending  (solid line) and Possible  Future Reductions  (dotted line)
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I/  If military  spending  falls  from 1972-85  to 1986-90  average  over  five  years.
2/ Assuming  regions  decrease  military  spending  from 1972-85  average  to that of  the Western  Hemisphere  in the period  1986-90  over  15  years.Figure 1 (cont'd). Various Country Groups: Simulated  Long-run Effects of Actual Past Changes
in Military Spending (solid line) and Possible  Future Reductions  (dotted line)
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1/  If military spending falls from 1972-85 to 1986-90 average over five years.
2/  Assuming regions decrease military spending from 1972-85 average to that of the Western Hemisphere in the period 1986-90 over 15 years.- 37  -
Table  8.  The Peace  Dividend: Simulated  Effects  of Decreasing  Regional  Militay Spending  Ratios  from their 197245
Aveage Levels  to the 1986-90  Level  for Western  Hemisphere  Developing  Countries I/
Country  Groups
Industrial  Developing  Countries
Countries  Asia  Eastern  Middle  North  Sub-Saharan  Western
Europe  East  Africa  Africa  Hemisphere
(In percent  of GDP)
1.  Averge Military
SpaxdingRatio,  3.97  6.35  11.75  10.34  8.13  3.12  2.16
1972-1985  2/
2. "Minimum"  Military
SpandigRatio2/  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94
3. Change  in Militry
Spending  Ratio  -2.03  -4.41  -9.81  -8.40  -6.19  -1.18  -0.22
(2 minu  1)
4. Asaociated  Chanp in
Ratio  of Investnent  1.50  1.63  4.90  3.30  1.81  0.58  0.15
tD  GDP 3/
Time
Horizon  Simulated  Minus  Baseline  Growth  Rates  of Per Capita  GDP
(YOMrs)
(In pecment  per anumn)
I  0.010  0.071  -0.028  0.019  0.082  -0.013  0.015
5  0.049  0.339  -0.131  0.091  0.391  -0.063  0.073
10  0.265  0.535  0.570  0.609  0.639  0.140  0.064
25  0.348  0.542  0.908  0.815  0.657  0.243  0.043
S0  0.179  0.279  0.467  0.420  0.338  0.125  0.022
co  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Timo
Horizon  Simulated  Minus  Baseline  Levels  of Per Capita  GDP
(years)
(In percent  of baseline  GDP)
I  0.0  0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.0  0.0
5  0.1  1.0  -0.4  0.3  1.2  -0.2  0.2
10  1.1  3.3  1.1  2.3  3.9  0.1  0.6
25  6.9  12.6  16.1  16.0  15.2  4.1  1.3
S0  13.2  224  32.4  30.7  27.0  8.5  2.1
ao  19.8  32.7  49.7  46.2  39.6  13.1  2.9
1/ The  simulation  exmis  is based  on the parumeter  estimates  given in Table 5,  column  4, and  Table  6, column  4.  Details  on how the
simulations  wer pefoired  ae given in Appendix  II.
2/ Derived  from  data in Hewitt  (1992). Line 2 is the 1986-90  average  military  spending  ratio of developing  countries  in the Western
Hanisphee.
3/ The change  in investment  ratio is produced  by the total change  in military  spending  ratio  with respect  to the baseline  military  spending
ratio (averge during 1972-85).- 38 -
The  dotted  lines  in the  lower  panels  represent  the  percentage  deviation  of
each  region's  per  capita  capacity  output  from  the  baseline  path  over a fifty
year  period  starting  from  1986.  As the  simulations  indicate,  the  further
gradual  declines  in military  spending  in all  regions  that  would  be
associated  with a lasting  improvement  in international  security  would  exert
very  marked  stimulative  effects  on the  growth  paths  of  per  capita  output  in
all  regions  (except  Western  Hemisphere,  where  there  is  assumed  to  be no
further  fall in  military  spending  after  1990).
The simulated  transitory  effects  on growth  rates  are  much  larger  than
in  the first  simulation. For  example,  in Eastern  Europe  where--on  our
assumptions--the  total  decline  in the  military  spending  ratio  would  be the
largest  (on  the  order  of 4.9  percent  of  GDP),  the  rate  of growth  of per
capita  GDP  would  rise to  a maximum  where it  was 0.9  percent  per  annum  higher
than  in the  baseline  simulation. In the  Middle  East,  Asia and  North  Africa,
growth  rates  would  reach  a  maximum  that  was  more that  0.6  percent  a  year
higher  from  years  10 to 25 of the  simulation.
As a result  of these  differences  in growth  rates,  the  ultimate  effects
on the  levels  of capacity  output  would  vary widely  across  regions,  but  would
generally  be large. When all  lagged  effects  had  worked  their  way through,
the  output  levels  for  Eastern  Europe  and the  Middle  East  would  be
50 percent  and  46 percent  higher,  respectively,  than  they  would  have  been if
the  reductions  in  military  spending  had not  occurred. In the  developing
countries  of Asia and  North  Africa  the  long-run  gain  would  be 30 to
40  percent,  and in sub-Saharan  Africa  over 10  percent. For  industrial
countries,  capacity  output  per capita  would  eventually  be  higher  by- 39 -
20 percent. This second  set  of simulations,  therefore,  suggests  that
military  spending  cuts  of a size  that  might  plausibly  be expected  to  occur
in each  region  if a comprehensive  global  peace  were achieved  would  exert
large  positive  Peace  Dividend  effects  on capacity  output  in  most  geographic
regions.
VI.  Summary  and  Conclusion
There  are  a number  of good  reasons  for  expecting  that  military  spending
cuts associated  with improved  international  security  would  be likely  to
enhance  long-run  economic  growth  performance. Thus  it is surprising  that
the  empirical  literature,  taken  as a whole,  yields  an ambiguous  answer  to
the  question  whether  military  spending  cuts  have a  positive  impact  on
growth. The present  paper  was motivated  by our  suspicion  that  the  ambiguous
results  of past studies  may reflect  weaknesses  in  estimation  methodology,
particularly  the failure  to exploit  both the  cross-section  and  time-series
dimensions  of available  data  using  appropriate  econometric  techniques.
To unravel  the  contradictory  empirical  findings,  we estimate  an
extension  of a standard  growth  model  that  includes  an investment  equation
and  a growth  equation,  both of  which  are  functions  of the  military  spending
ratio  as well as other  determinants.  We estimate  the  model  on panel  data
for  a large  sample  of industrial  and  developing  countries.
In contrast  to standar'd  cross-section  estimates  which  give  no clear
significant  results,  the  panel  estimates  of both the  investment  and  the
growth  equations  are  robust  in the  sense  that  all  variables  enter
significantly  with the  expected  sign. The empirical  results  provide  a clear- 40 -
answer  to the  question  whether  military  expenditure  is  economically
unproductive. Our  answer  is in  the  affirmative.  When the  military  spending
ratio  is added  to a growth  equation  that  already  includes  the  determinants
suggested  by standard  theory  the  direct  effect  of  higher  military  spending
on per capita  output  growth  is  unambiguously  negative  and  large. The
indirect  impact  of  military  spending  on  economic  growth,  via its  negative
impact  on productive  investment,  is  also  found  to  be statistically
significant. Thus  our  empirical  estimates  clearly  indicate  that  high levels
of military  expenditure  detract  from  economic  growth  both  because  they
reduce  productive  fixed  capital  formation  and  because  they  act  more
generally  to distort  resource  allocation.
Using simulations  with the  estimated  model  we quantify  the  likely  size
of the  Peace  Dividend  that  would  result  over  the  long  run  from  sustained
cuts in  military  spending  ratios. We find  that  the  improved  security
conditions  and  associated  military  spending  cuts in  most  regions  in the  late
1980s  will lead--provided  they  are  sustained--to  substantial  gains  in
capacity  output  over  the  long  run. On the  other  hand,  the  unsettled
security  conditions  and  the  associated  increases  in  military  spending  in
Eastern  Europe  and  sub-Saharan  Africa  in  the  late  1980s  have further
weakened  the  already  low  rates  of growth  of per  capita  output  in these
regions. These  simulated  effects  are  large  enough  in themselves  to  justify
our  belief  that there  will  be a substantial  Peace  Dividend  from  the  cuts in
military  spending  that  have  already  taken  place  in  most  regions.
Deeper  cuts in  military  spending  that  would  be made  possible  by a
generalized  peace  would  result  in an  even  larger  Peace  Dividend.- 41 -
Specifically, we find that a generalized improvement in security that
allowed military spending ratios in all regions to fall to the levels
actually observed in the Western Hemisphere in recent years would result in
very large long-run gains in capacity output in most regions.  For example,
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East--where military spending ratios have
been high in the past--the salutary effects of military spending cuts on
investment and growth could increase capacity output in the very long run by
nearly 50 percent relative to the levels that would have prevailed if
military spending ratios had remained fixed at the high average levels that
were prevalent in these regions over 1972-85.  The Peace Dividend effects
for other regions, though less spectacular than in these cases, are still
very large in the long run.
It is also relevant to note that these simulation results may actually
tend to understate the positive output-growth effects of enhanced
international security.  First, a sustained global peace might eventually
reduce the world military spending ratio by more than our simulations
assumed.  Universal peace, after all, would be the classic example of a
public good.  Furthermore, although our simulations explicitly assume that
all determinants of investment and growth other than military spending would
remain unchanged even if a generalized  peace were achieved, it is likely
that there would be positive synergies in the evolution of productive
technology.  Since improved security  would allow a greater proportion of
research and development expenditures to  be devoted to nonmilitary goals, it
would stimulate market-oriented technological innovation, thus enhancing the
growth of total factor productivity.- 42-
Over the  long  run,  improvements  in international  security  would almost
certainly  result  in  improvements  in  the  other  economic  variables  that are
significant  determinants  of economic  growth. As political  tensions
subsided,  more  and  more  countries  would  be able to concentrate  on improving
economic  performance  by dismantling  barriers  to free international  exchange
of goods,  services,  and  financial  assets. In this  way, a generalized  peace
would  foster  economic  interdependence,  more open  trading  systems,  and
associated  specialization  gains. For  analogous  reasons,  a  better
international  security  situation  would  also  allow  national  education
programs  to  concentrate  on productive  skills,  and  participation  in the
educational  systems  could  rise  markedly  in a  number  of populous  countries
where  political  insecurity  has long  limited  educational  opportunities.
Given  these  considerations,  the  key  policy  implication  of this study  is
straightforward:  The  Peace  Dividend  from  military  spending  cuts is likely
to  be very substantial  over  the  longer  term.  Thus reductions  in military
spending  should  be viewed  as attractive  structural  policy  elements  of
macroeconomic  packages  designed  to  enhance  the  growth  path of capacity
output.- 43 - APPENDIX
Data Sources  and  Definitions,  and Sample  of Countries
A.  Data sources:
The  basic  data  used in this study  are  annual  observations.  The
following  variables  were taken  from  Summers  and  Heston  (1991),  Penn  World
Tables:
z  :  Natural  logarithm  of real  GDP  per worker.
sk  :  Ratio  of real investment  to real  GDP (five-year  average).
n  :  Growth  rate  of number  of  workers  (five-year  average).
The following  variable  was taken  from  Mankiw,  Romer  and  Weil (1992):
sh  :  Percent  of working-age  population  enrolled  in secondary
schools  (average  for  the  period  1960-85).
Data on tariffs  were taken  from  Lee (1993):
f  :  Import-share-weighted  average  of tariffs  on intermediate  and
capital  goods  (from  various  years in  the  early  1980s).
Data  on military  expenditures  were  provided  by Daniel  Hewitt,  who
collected  the  data  from  the  1992  Yearbook  of the Stockholm  International
Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI):
m  :  Ratio  of SIPRI  military  expenditures  to GDP (data  are  annual
for  1971-1990).
Data  on the incidence  of wars  was  provided  by Barro  and  Lee (1993):
w  :  Ratio  of years  spent  in international'wars  to the  total
number  of years  in the  period  1960-1985.- 44 - APPENDIX I
B.  List of Countries included in Hewitt's 124-Country Sample, and in our
79-Country Panel Data Set used for Estimation.
(Countries from Hewitt's sample that are included in our panel data
estimation are marked with an asterisk).
1.  Industrial Countries
Canada *  Italy *
U.S.A. *  Luxembourg
Japan *  Netherlands *
Austria *  Norway *
Belgium *  Portugal *
Denmark *  Singapore *
Finland *  Spain *
France *  Sweden *
Germany, Federal Republic of *  Switzerland *
Greece *  United Kingdom *
Ireland *  Australia *
2.  Developing countries
Algeria *  Gabon
Angola  German Democratic Republic
Argentina *  Ghana *
Bahrain  Guatemala *
Bangladesh *  Guinea-Bissau
Benin  *  Guyana
Bolivia *  Haiti *
Botswana  Honduras
Brazil *  Hungary
Bulgaria  India *
Burkina Faso *  Indonesia *
Burundi *  Iran
Cameroon *  Iraq
Central African Republic *  Israel
Chad  Jamaica *
China  Jordan *
Chile *  Kenya *
Colombia *  Korea *
Congo *  Kuwait
Costa Rica *  Lebanon
Cote d'Ivoire  Liberia
Cuba  Libya
Cyprus  Madagascar *
Czechoslovakia  Malawi *
Dominican Republic  Malaysia *
Ecuador *  Mali- 45 - APPENDIX I
Egypt *  Mauritania
El Salvador *  Mauritius *
Ethiopia *  Mexico *
Fiji  Morocco *
Mozambique  Sudan *
Myanmar  Swaziland
Nepal *  Syrian AR *
Nicaragua *  Taiwan, Province of China
Niger  Tanzania *
Nigeria *  Thailand *
Oman  Togo
Pakistan *  Trinidad and Tobago *
Panama  Tunisia *
Paraguay *  Turkey *
Philippines *  Uganda *
Peru *  United Arab Emirates
Poland  U.S.S.R
Romania  Uruguay *
Rwanda *  Venezuela *
Saudi Arabia  Yemen AR
Senegal *  Yemen PDR
Sierra Leone *  Yugoslavia
Somalia  *  Zaire *
South Africa  Zambia *
Sri Lanka *  Zimbabwe *- 46 - APPENDIX II
Simulation  Exercise
There  are  three  elements  that  determine  the  gains  in  GDP over time
for  a given  reduction  in  the  ratio  of  military  spending  to  GDP (M/GDP  - m).
First,  the  effect  of  m on the  ratio  of investment  to  GDP, and  the  latter's
effect  on per capita  GDP  growth;  second,  the  direct  effect  of  m on per
capita  GDP growth;  and third,  the  effect  of the  current  per  capita  GDP on
its  growth  rate (the  convergence  effect.) From  equations  1 and 2,
the  percentage  gain in  per  capita  GDP (Azt)  for  a given  percentage  change  in
the  military  spending  ratio  (Aln(m))  is given  by
Azt  = (Om+eklm)Alnm
Azt+l  [ (1+7)+l1(0m+eknm)Alrun
Azt+j  = [. (l+Y)1  ](inm+8knm)Alnm
Az. - [yJ(e.+ekq.)Alnm  (for  -1<7<0)
The estimates  for  8mS Ok,  and  y are  taken  from  Table  5, column  4;
and the  estimate  for  nm  from  Table  6,  column  4.
The  change  of the  level  of the  investment  ratio  produced  by a
given  percentage  change  in  the  military  spending  ratio  can  be approximated
as follows:
Askt  - [i7m Aln m]  skt-.
Aln(m)  for  each  group  of countries  is  computed  as follows:
Alnm  - ln(Average  H/GDP(1986-1990))  - ln(Average  M/GDP(1972-1985))- 47 -
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